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ROBERT FRANK-LEONARD WILSON; 
 
BUNCE D. ATKINSON, 
Trustee 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 96-cv-01831) 
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson, Chief Judge 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 28, 1997 
 
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, NYGAARD and 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 




100 Calef Avenue 
Narragansett, RI 02882 
Appellant, Pro Se 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal by Lisa Baldino from the district court's 
affirmance of a bankruptcy court order requires us to 
decide whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion 
in denying Baldino's motion for relief from the automatic 
stay in proceedings against the Debtor, Robert Frank- 
Leonard Wilson. Baldino sought relief from the stay in order 
to proceed with a pending appeal in a state court action 
against Wilson. The bankruptcy court denied the request, 
reasoning that the state court appeal should not proceed 
until the bankruptcy court determined whether any 
judgment Baldino might receive would be dischargeable. 
The district court agreed and affirmed. We find two distinct 
grounds for reversing the district court: (1) the bankruptcy 
court relied on an erroneous legal premise in exercising its 
discretion to deny relief from the stay and (2) the 
bankruptcy court's order effectively prevents Baldino from 
challenging the state court judgment in any forum. 
Accordingly, we will reverse and remand to the district 
court for entry of an order directing the bankruptcy court 
to lift the automatic stay for the limited purpose of allowing 
Baldino's appeal. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. In bankruptcy cases, the district court sits as an 
appellate court and, therefore, we exercise plenary review 
over the district court judgment. Brown v. Pennsylvania 
State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 
1988). We review a decision to deny the automatic stay for 
abuse of discretion. See Claughton v. Mixson, 33 F.3d 4, 5 
(4th Cir. 1994); Holtkamp v. Littlefield (Matter of Holtkamp), 
669 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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On July 27, 1989, Wilson signed and swore to a criminal 
complaint charging Baldino with criminal trespass and 
harassment. Wilson's complaint was subsequently 
dismissed. Four years later, on July 20, 1993, Baldino filed 
a civil complaint against Wilson in the Superior Court of 
New Jersey. Baldino asserted a claim of malicious 
prosecution against Wilson based on the 1989 criminal 
complaint. 
 
On February 3, 1995 the state court granted Wilson's 
motion for summary judgment. The court found that 
Baldino had not made out a prima facie case of malicious 
prosecution because she failed to show that Wilson acted 
without probable cause. Baldino appealed. The parties filed 
briefs on appeal and argument was scheduled for February 
6, 1996. On September 7, 1995, Wilson filed a petition for 
relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby 
automatically staying the appeal. 
 
Baldino filed a pro se motion for relief from the automatic 
stay, seeking permission to complete her appeal. The 
bankruptcy court denied Baldino's request, reasoning: 
 
Why would I grant stay relief before the 
dischargeability of the debt has been determined? . . . 
You could be completely successful in the State Court 
and not be successful on the nondischargeability 
determination. . . . [S]imply because you prevail in the 
State Court does not necessarily mean that you will 
prevail in a non-dischargeability action . . . there's no 
need to determine the extent and validity of claims 
unless there's going to be a distribution or unless the 
debt has been determined to be dischargeable. 
 
The district court adopted the reasoning of the bankruptcy 
court and affirmed the order denying Baldino's request for 




The bankruptcy court's reasoning rests on the premise 
that even if Baldino prevailed in the state court malicious 
prosecution action, her judgment against Wilson would not 
necessarily be nondischargeable in the bankruptcy 
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proceeding. This premise is incorrect as a matter of law. 
See Langanella v. Braen (In re Braen), 900 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
In Braen, as in the present case, the debtor was sued in 
New Jersey state court for malicious prosecution. The state 
court action in Braen went to trial and a jury entered a 
verdict against the debtor. The verdict included afinding 
that the debtor "was activated by a malicious motive in 
prosecuting the criminal complaint," a finding which is a 
necessary element for a claim of malicious prosecution. Id. 
at 623. Before the successful plaintiff in the malicious 
prosecution action could collect on the judgment, the 
debtor filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The plaintiff 
asked the bankruptcy court to declare the state court 
judgment nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), 
which provides that a creditor can avoid the discharge of a 
debt incurred "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor 
. . . ." The bankruptcy court held that the debt was 
nondischargeable. The court gave preclusive effect to the 
New Jersey court's finding that the debtor acted 
maliciously. On appeal we stated: "The bankruptcy court 
did not err in holding that issue preclusion barred[the 
debtor] from relitigating whether [the plaintiff 's] judgment 
was a debt incurred `for willful and malicious injury by the 
debtor.' " Id. at 630. 
 
We see no reason why the reasoning of Braen should not 
apply to the present case, even though Appellant Baldino 
was unsuccessful at trial in the state court. To prevail in 
state court, of necessity, Baldino would have to prove that 
Wilson acted maliciously. If she is ultimately successful and 
eventually obtains a judgment, it would be 
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) as a debt incurred by 
the debtor's willful and malicious conduct. We therefore 
conclude that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion 
by relying on an erroneous legal premise, to wit, in 
declaring "[Baldino] could be completely successful in the 
State Court and not be successful on the 
nondischargeability determination". See Stuebben v. Gioioso 
(In re Gioioso), 979 F.2d 956, 959 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when its ruling is 
founded on an error of law). 
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II. 
 
Moreover, an additional and independent reason 
supports our concern over the bankruptcy court's refusal to 
lift the stay. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the 
bankruptcy court shall grant relief from the automatic stay 
"for cause." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(1) does not 
define "cause," leaving courts to consider what constitutes 
cause based on the totality of the circumstances in each 
particular case. Trident Assocs. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
(In re Trident Assocs.), 52 F.3d 127 (6th Cir. 1995). We 
believe "cause" exists under the circumstances of this case. 
 
If the bankruptcy proceeding continues without 
modification of the stay, issue preclusion will prevent 
Baldino from challenging the effect of the state court 
judgment in the bankruptcy court. It is settled law that 
issue preclusion applies to bankruptcy proceedings. 
Graham v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Graham), 973 
F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1992). As our discussion of Braen makes 
clear, issue preclusion applies even where the previous 
adjudication occurred in state court. Braen, 900 F.2d at 
624-630; see also First Nat'l Bank v. Brown (In re Brown), 
951 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1991). If Baldino raises her claim for 
malicious prosecution in bankruptcy court, the state 
court's determination that Baldino did not show lack of 
probable cause will preclude her from relitigating this issue. 
Although Baldino's appeal is pending in state court, the 
state trial court's resolution of this issue is"final" for 
preclusion purposes. See Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern 
Food Corp., 207 N.J.Super. 607, 504 A.2d 828, 836 (1985) 
(New Jersey law recognizes a judgment as "final" for 
preclusion purposes even though it is pending on appeal); 
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (federal courts 
afford state court judgments the same preclusive effect that 
would exist in the rendering state). 
 
The bankruptcy court is also prohibited from reviewing 
the state court's judgment by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
which prohibits lower federal courts from sitting as effective 
courts of appeal for state court judgments. See , e.g., D.C. 
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) 
(citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 403 (1923)); 
Besing v. Hawthorne (In re Besing), 981 F.2d 1488, 1496 
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(5th Cir. 1993) ("The Bankruptcy Code was not intended to 
give litigants a second chance to challenge a state court 
judgment nor did it intend for the Bankruptcy Court to 
serve as an appellate court [for state court proceedings]") 
(quoting In re G & R Mfg. Co., 91 B.R. 994 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 
1988)). 
 
As demonstrated, Baldino cannot relitigate the adverse 
trial court judgment in bankruptcy court. If she is denied 
relief from the automatic stay, she will have no opportunity 
to challenge the adverse judgment before the bankruptcy 
proceedings are complete. If Baldino is not afforded an 
opportunity to pursue her appeal in state court, she will 
have no forum to litigate her cause. Accordingly, we believe 
it is necessary to lift the stay to permit prosecution of her 
appeal to the state appellate courts. 
 
Our approach is consistent with that taken by other 
courts. See, e.g., Metz v. Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank (In re 
Metz), 165 B.R. 769, 771 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (evaluating 
the totality of the circumstances and granting stay relief to 
allow appeal of state court judgment); Matter of Highway 
Truck Drivers and Helpers Local Union 107, 98 B.R. 698, 
705 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (affirming bankruptcy court's grant of 
stay relief on the grounds that state court appeal was 
debtor's "only vehicle to attack the adverse judgment"), 
rev'd on other grounds, In re Highway Truck Drivers & 
Helpers Local 107, 888 F.2d 293 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Moreover, our decision is supported by the legislative 
history of § 362(d)(1), which states in pertinent part: 
 
[I]t will often be more appropriate to permit proceedings 
to continue in their place of origin, when no great 
prejudice to the bankruptcy estate would result, in 
order to leave the parties to their chosen forum and to 
relieve the bankruptcy court from many duties that 
may be handled elsewhere. 
 
S.Rep. No. 95-989 at 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N 5787, 5836. We perceive no great prejudice to 
the bankruptcy estate in granting relief from the stay. Such 
relief will expedite the resolution of Baldino's claim by 
eliminating it if Wilson prevails on appeal, or by rendering 
it final and nondischargeable if Baldino ultimately prevails. 
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Moreover, Baldino's claim can be resolved more quickly in 
state court on appeal than in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
as the parties have already filed briefs on appeal. 
 
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the 
parties and conclude that no further discussion is 
necessary. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and remanded for entry of an order directing the 
bankruptcy court to grant Baldino's request for relief from 
the stay for the limited purpose of allowing her appeal to 
proceed in the New Jersey courts. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
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